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adverse effect, in the long run, upon the ability of underdeveloped countries to secure public money from governments of countries whose private
investors complain about the matter.
Numerous techniques have been advocated for dealing with this complex,
ranging from ambitious investment codes of behavior to which host countries are desired to conform, through a variety of arbitral or litigative
techniques designed to provide more adequate remedies for state action
which injures investment, to reassessments of the international legal ideas
of just compensation, and to the newer, postwar national and multilateral
investment guaranties which insure against risks which eventuate. These
and perhaps others will be discussed in the setting of the social change and
accompanying conflict which we see about us.
The CnAmmAN then introduced the first speaker, Professor A. A.
Fatouros of the Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE
ILLUSION OF LEGAL CERTAINTY
By A. A. FATOUROS
Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario
It is, no doubt, a commonplace to assert that we are living in an age
of revolution. Commonplace or not, it is true. This is an era of rapid
change on all levels: cultural, economic, technological, social, political and
moral. It is clear that deep social conflict marks both the international
and the national scenes. The world has always been divided into rich and
poor countries, but it is only recently that the poorer states have acquired
political significance in international affairs, that their voice can be heard
and their influence felt in the councils which were formerly restricted to the
great Powers of Europe and North America. The division of the world
into "haves" and "have-nots" is playing an increasing r6le on the international scene, a r6le which is already more important than the ideological
division into East and West. When discussing the problems of international economic development, it is useful to keep this fact in mind. After
all, but for this increasing importance of the "have-nots," we probably
would not have been discussing the present topic today.
I intend to start my discussion by stating certain basic propositions
which I shall treat as the assumptions underlying my approach to the
problem with which this panel is dealing. I do not mean that these propositions are not open to question; they certainly are and I am prepared to
discuss them, if need be. For present purposes, however, it is more convenient to state them in this manner.
My first assumption is that international economic development and, in
particular, the development of the now backward regions of the world,
is a policy objective of first magnitude for all members of the world community, and this includes states, developed and underdeveloped, as well as

private persons, individuals and companies. A second assumption is that
the process of development will have to start immediately and it will have
to reach a satisfactory level, meaning a largely self-sustaining level,
within a relatively short time, say within the next two or three decades.
So that, in what follows, economic development means speedy economic
development. I am assuming further that it is possible to separate, for
purposes of study and analysis, the problems of the cold war from those
of economic development. This, of course, is well-nigh impossible at the
final policy level.
The last proposition I should like to state is that private foreign investment is today necessary, even if not by itself sufficient, for the speedy
development of the less developed countries. On this point various opinions
have been expressed lately. They range from advocacy of the total abandonment of private foreign investment in the less developed countries to
support for the view that private capital can by itself assure the development of these countries. I shall not discuss these views here, apart from
stating that I assume both to be wrong. They may be brought up later,
of course.
These "assumptions" have already made fairly evident my basic approach in this paper. What I am concerned with here is not the "protection of foreign investment" nor the safeguarding of the so-called sovereign rights of capital-importing countries. I am concerned with international economic development and the role of private foreign investment
in it. From this point of view, the security of private foreign investment
is not a value in itself, but is valuable to the extent that it is necessary for
development. Its necessity cannot be denied, since some degree of security is a precondition for future foreign investment in the less developed
countries. On the other hand, the approach here advocated is, I submit,
a useful one, in that it tends to put the various relevant considerations
into perspective. If protection of foreign capital were the basic consideration, then the best remedy is already in the hands of private investors.
Foreign investors, in most cases, do not have to invest in developing countries. They can then assure the security of their investments by investing
only in those, usually already developed, countries which offer full assurances of protection (in fact, the majority of investors do just that).
On the other hand, if complete safeguarding of the national economy from
foreign interference were the only desirable aim, the governments of less
developed countries could easily refuse to accept foreign investments and
try to do without them. On both sides, the remedies for the realization
of such extreme positions are already available (in the long run, at least,
if not always in the short). An approach which focuses on international
economic development, however, tends to reject b6th extreme positions as
irrelevant. From this point of view, the problem is how to bring these at
first glance contradictory positions together, how to arrive at a compromise
which will make possible speedier economic development. And this can
only be done, in the final analysis, under conditions which are acceptable
both to the peoples (and the governments) of the less developed countries

and to the aliens who are willing to risk their capital in these countries.
Inside the less developed countries the drive for economic development
is bound to bring changes which are revolutionary in character. What
we call "economic development" is by no means solely economic in
character; it is in fact a vast process of social, cultural, political and economic change, whose exact causes, order of sequence and effects we still
do not know with any degree of certainty. It is precisely because it involves such extensive change, that economic development has captured the
imagination and faith of millions of people. At the same time, no such
extensive change can be painless or easy.
Perhaps because of the influence of official phrases and descriptions,
we tend sometimes to visualize this process in highly idealized terms: we
see masses of men fired by a common ideal and working wholeheartedly,
in close co-operation, for the achievement of their high purposes. We of
the Western countries should know better. We should be aware that social
and economic change is neither sweetly pleasant nor peaceful. It is a
painful and difficult process which involves destruction as much as constructive effort; the serenity and beauty of immemorial custom are replaced
by the ugliness and the often meaningless agitation of new methods, yet
untried or slavishly imitated from other cultures; the energies which are
liberated may work for bad as well as for good. After centuries of relatively peaceful and slow evolution, the Western countries still have many
unsolved problems, many conflicts and show much lack of understanding
of themselves, their neighbors or more distant cultures. How can we then
expect the peoples of the newly emerging states to have already resolved
their far more basic and difficult problems (some of which we may have
had a hand in creating, but let us not go into that) and to offer to the
outside a calm and forgiving attitude? This is not pleading for charity
or tolerance on the part of the West; it is stating the need for intelligent
understanding and consequent adjustment.
The situation in the less developed countries today constitutes a challenge
to our traditional conceptions of public international law. While no single
general description can be given which would be valid for so many countries with so many cultural and political backgrounds, certain common
patterns are to be found in most of them. What strikes one the most is
a certain basic instability, a precariousness in their internal conditions.
Their problems are so immense, their objectives so distant, that one cannot
see how the present situation can continue for a long time without a breakdown or without a fall into some form of complete anarchy.
In the less developed countries there prevails today an atmosphere of
constant "public emergency" comparable to that which exists in the developed countries of the West during a war. Several points of similarity
may be noted. The country's economy is administered in both cases by
a state bureaucracy with extensive powers of direct and indirect interference. The borderline between matters of public and of private concern
tends to be confused, if not eliminated. Economic and other problems
are looked at from a peculiar dual viewpoint of efficiency, on the one hand,

and national honor and prestige (you may call it propaganda), on the
other. An atmosphere of crisis prevails. Every success or failure in the
drive for development (as in the war effort) assumes an exaggerated importance. Governments (and, to a varying extent, the people behind
them) lack patience with delays or tolerance for mistakes which may endanger the success of the economic development effort. There is even less
tolerance for outright refusals to conform with the state's policies on such
matters. In essence, there is little desire for compromise, little recognition
of the necessity to give in now in order to gain something later. Despite
pious references to long-run considerations, it is the short-run that governs.
Wherever action is involved, governments feel that they cannot afford to
wait for the effects of long-run policies.
To describe these attitudes is not to defend them. No doubt, emotion
often obscures the realities that judgment ought to calmly consider; what
is demanded is sometimes impossible, the policies so furiously defended are
often wrong, the points of dispute are sometimes trivial and, with a little
patience, could easily have been resolved. The fact is, however, that economic development is for the less developed countries a matter of survival,
an issue as vital as any question of war and peace. We may regret some
of the attitudes caused by this sense of urgency, but we have to take them
into consideration and treat them as given in order to be able to plan and
act effectively.
The consequences of this situation with respect to private foreign investment are too well known to need detailed exposition. Investments in
the less developed countries necessarily involve a high degree of risk, to
start with, in view of the state of the economy, its instability and lack of
balance. To these unavoidable economic risks, new risks are added: the
laws and policies under which the foreign enterprise is going to operate
are far from certain, the prevailing attitudes and prejudices import new
elements of instability and uncertainty. The difficulties of the present
situation become readily apparent when one attempts to determine with
any precision the remedies available to investors in the case where the
government of the country of investment takes measures which, whether
directly or indirectly, affect adversely the investors' interests. In this
case, and in any other case where a serious dispute arises between the
foreign investor and the host government, the former finds that he cannot
be certain of the effectiveness of the legal remedies he has. Before considering, however, the degree to which this is true (and that it is true to
some degree is undeniable), I should like to direct your attention to certain
other considerations.
Most of the discussions about foreign investment and its legal security
center on the remedies available to foreign investors in case of dispute and
on their effectiveness or lack thereof. It is my submission that this approach is insufficient and even misleading. By focusing our attention on
the formal possibilities of recourse open to investors in what are, after
all, exceptional situations, namely, those of major disputes with the host
government, we are losing sight of the complete picture. In order to

ascertain the degree of certainty within any legal order, the order as a
whole should be considered. If attention is directed only to disputes and
their probable solution, a relatively high degree of uncertainty is bound
to be noted, even within the stable societies of the Western states. The
exclusive concern with the lawfulness or legality of particular measures
is as out of place in international economic relations as it is in international politics. Not because law is irrelevant or unimportant, but
because the question itself, "Is it lawful?" is meaningless when taken out
of its particular context. It is only by looking at the legal order as a
whole, in its economic and political context, that we are able to perceive
the degree of legal certainty which obtains in fact.
The evolution in the forms of foreign investment is of some interest
in this connection and it is, I submit, quite instructive. In the nineteenth
century and the first three decades of the twentieth, the prevailing form of
foreign investment in the then developing countries was portfolio investment. The governments of these countries would float loans in the capital
markets of London, Paris or New York to finance their road or railway
building or, sometimes, their current budget expenditures. They often
over-extended themselves and they had difficulties in keeping up the service
of their debt; they consequently tried to extricate themselves through
various measures, on the legal aspects of which a vast literature soon
amassed. The financial crisis of the thirties (as well as certain other developments with which we cannot deal here) put an end to the problem: it
has become virtually impossible for most of the less developed countries
to raise any considerable amount of capital through the flotation of loans
in foreign capital markets. Incidentally, this has also led to a marked
decline in the output of juristic literature on public loans, a fact which
perhaps proves that jurists keep in close touch with economic and political
realities.
The form of foreign private investment which prevails today is direct
investment, that is, investment in enterprises operating in foreign countries.
Now, it is obvious that direct investment entails a much higher degree of
involvement in the host country's economy than does portfolio investment.
It would then appear, at first blush, that such investment, far from being
safer than portfolio investment, is subject to additional dangers and is,
therefore, more insecure. It would thus seem paradoxical that direct investment prevails today in the international scene precisely because of
the lack of security for portfolio investment. The paradox persists if
one considers the remedies available to investors in the two cases; though,
in the case of direct investment, the investor appears to have somewhat
more numerous and effective remedies, the difference is hardly of sufficient
magnitude to explain the prevalence of this form of investment. The
paradox is only explained when one considers certain other differences
between the two forms. In the first place, the two are undertaken by
different classes of investors; in contradistinction to portfolio investment,
direct investment is undertaken by entrepreneurs, men whose very business is to take risks. In the second place, direct investment involves 4

higher degree of choice and, of course, of control. The investor does not
choose merely between lending or not lending his capital, he chooses between several alternative sets of conditions for investing and he retains,
after the investment, a high degree of control over the policies and operations of the enterprise. Furthermore, he can count in most cases on the
concrete effect on the economy of the country of investment of the operation
of his enterprise and this gives him considerable bargaining power. The
capital he invests is only part of his contribution: the industrial know-how
or the possible control of outlets for the sale of primary products are at
least equally important. These factors, together with the higher rate of
return that direct investment offers, tend to compensate for the additional
risks.
This short and unoriginal excursion in the history of foreign investment
shows clearly that the foreign investor has, with respect to direct investment, a considerable amount of choice both at the very beginning and
during the operation of his enterprise and it also shows that this fact
is of paramount importance. Legal considerations should be brought into
play at these points, too, not only with respect to possible disputes with the
host government. Is it really necessary to stress, before an audience of
American lawyers, the importance of the preventive and advisory rather
than the remedial r6le of the lawyer? At the time of the establishment
of the enterprise in the foreign country, law and the lawyer's trained
ingenuity should play a most important r8le. It would be desirable to
establish openly a pattern of continuing interlocking relationships, legal
and economic, between the investor and his enterprise on the one side, and
the government and the economy of the country of investment, on the other.
It is clear that it is not enough to seek an initial good bargain. It is far
more important to provide in the basic documents (whether contracts or
administrative orders) for ways of communication between government and
investor which can be kept open even at a time of crisis. It is preferable
for the investor to recognize, at the very outset, that his investment and
the future operation of his enterprise are matters of public concern for the
capital-importing country and to arrange from the very beginning for the
ways in which this concern will be expressed. And jurists can profitably
devote their time and ingenuity to the creation of new forms and methods
of association making operative and evident the interdependence in each
particular case of the interests of the foreign investors and the capitalimporting countries.
Flexibility is needed in choosing the form of investment, the kind of
enterprise, or the method of financing. The creation of joint ventures with
local private or public capital, is one kind of solution to these problems
(and in this connection it is only necessary and sufficient to refer to the
monumental study of Joint InternationalBusiness Ventures prepared under
the direction of Professor Friedmann). Association with foreign public
capital, from international or United States financial institutions is another
possibility; such association will generally provide additional security to
the investor. Another possibility is the undertaking of specific obligations

relating to matters of public concern, such as the training of nationals
of the host state, the provision of certain basic facilities, co-operation with
the host government or with international agencies in specific development
projects in the foreign enterprise's region of operation, even if these
projects are not directly related to the main purposes of the enterprise.
These are not theoretical propositions; they are descriptions of obligations
which have in fact been undertaken in many instances. The basic element
is the provision for arrangements which will have to be implemented
throughout the operation of the enterprise. The continuing character
of the relationship is thus made evident.
It cannot be denied, of course, that, in spite of all legal and economic
arrangements and in spite of all good advice to the foreign investors
or the foreign governments, differences are bound to arise. There exists
today an urgent need for devising and applying methods for the orderly
settlement of any such disputes. In the long run, such orderly settlement
will benefit both the foreign investors and the less developed countries.
There have been recently repeated suggestions for the formulation of an
over-all set of principles applicable to the relations between them. One
basic problem is that there is no over-all agreement on the identity and
content of these principles. In fact, such principles have not yet been
fully elaborated; they still have to be found, formulated and accepted by
a majority of the members of the world community. Other recent proposals suggest the creation of a system of arbitral tribunals to which all
investment disputes would be referred. I have suggested elsewhere that at
this stage, at least, the proper method for settling disputes between governments and foreign investors is conciliation rather than compulsory arbitration. I may summarize my argument briefly:
The conflicts between foreign investors and the states of investment are
not due basically to disagreements over the legal rules applicable. They
are caused by the demand of the "new" states for a reappraisal of the
existing legal and economic relations and for the establishment of new legal
rules to govern these matters. The situation is comparable to that of labor
law in late nineteenth-century Britain; what is involved now (as it was
then) is not the elucidation of the existing legal rules, but their change
through legislation. On the international scene, it is well known that
arbitral tribunals tend to be judicial in character, allocating to themselves
at most an interstitial legislative r6le. Today, this is not sufficient, because
the needed changes in the law are too far-reaching. In the absence of an
international legislature, the best way in which the existing rules or relationships can be changed is through the agreement of the parties. And
conciliation provides the institutional framework for bringing together the
parties to a dispute and suggesting concrete solutions, founded on all
relevant considerations, economic and political as well as legal. Such a
procedure will then assist in the solution of particular problems and disputes and, secondarily, in the creation of tentative new rules founded on
the concrete solutions of several similar disputes.
It is true that some disputes will not be capable of being resolved in this

manner. With respect to investment problems as well as other international problems, it is true that no method can guarantee the solution of
all disputes. It is better to accept this as an unpleasant fact rather than
attempt to uphold strict rules of law by divorcing them from reality.
Such a process would give us at best but an illusion of legal certainty
where no certainty really exists. No investment code in the world would
have affected the evolution of the situation in Cuba. And if Dr. Castro's
regime is overthrown, no protestations of international legality and the
binding force of contracts are going to stop its democratic successor from
severing its commercial ties with the Soviet Union and China, if it wishes
to do so. We should then try to solve those problems that can be solved
and to diminish the unpleasant consequences of those that stay without a
solution.
The traditional body of public international law can be of considerable
assistance in all this. First of all, extensive use can be made of its institutions, political, economic and judicial. Secondly, it constitutes a most
useful repository of methods, techniques and general principles which can
be applied by analogy to the relations between foreign investors and host
governments. As far as specific legal rules are concerned, international
law can only provide an external framework of rules to which recourse can
be had in extreme situations. In a sense, this is the traditional approach
to the subject, the approach stressing the existence of a minimum standard
of treatment of aliens, with the emphasis on that first word, minimum.
Obviously, a minimum standard is not an ideal one, nor does it even describe a desirable method of treatment; it only determines the outside
limits of the tolerable. In matters of the treatment of the person of aliens,
judicial procedures and the like, this function of the minimum standard
of international law is clear; its requirements are certainly much lower
than those in effect in the domestic legal order of most developed democracies. With respect to property matters, however, what is sometimes
referred to as a "minimum standard" is often a description of the treatment of private property in the most property-conscious of the Western
democracies. A similar difference in the conception of the proper r~le of
international law rules underlies the current controversy regarding the
legal effects of state measures affecting foreign interests founded on a
contract with the host government. It has been suggested, as you know,
that such state measures constitute an international wrong, unless they are
specifically justified on the grounds of national defense, criminal law
and the like. The more or less traditional view of the matter, which I
myself support, holds that an international tort arises in such cases only
after a subsequent denial of justice or where the state has manifestly
abused its rights. Since in most cases of importance a denial of justice is
likely to arise, this insistence on its presence may appear to constitute
mere quibbling. The usefulness of such insistence, however, lies in its
making evident the proper r~le of international law rules in such matters,
namely, that they should be invoked as a last resort in exceptional circumstances.

It may be that in stressing the need for flexibility and ingenuity, great
emphasis has appeared to be laid on the actions of investors, while the
attitude of the less developed countries seemed to be taken for granted.
To a large extent, this is accidental; there is no doubt that the states of
investment should also show a high degree of flexibility in order to take the
maximum advantage of existing opportunities for development. A flexible
arrangement is usually flexible on both sides. There are in fact many
indications that the less developed nations are not generally taking an
abstract doctrinaire stand on matters of foreign investment, but prefer to
work out specific arrangements founded on a basic flexible position. This
lack of "hard, and fast policies" has been convincingly described in Professor Lissitzyn's recent study of "International Law in a Divided World."
It has to be admitted, however, that there is something more to this
emphasis on the actions of investors rather than host governments. It has
been my assumption that international economic development is to the
advantage of both the developed and the less developed countries. But it
is the developed that will have to make the first steps toward the underdeveloped; the "haves" will have to show the "have-nots" that they are
capable of sacrificing some temporary advantages in order to better achieve
the common goal. Foreign aid is obviously the clearest manifestation of
such an attitude, but similar considerations, applied in different manners
and probably to a less extent, also obtain in the field of foreign investment.
It is a psychological fact of life that he who is in a stronger position for
the time being must be the one who will have to show first that he does
not intend to exploit his position, in order to induce the weaker party
to stop defending itself and start moving toward the common goal. Again,
I am not talking in terms of charity and benevolence; what I am referring
to is something that most businessmen are prepared to do and are doing
in more familiar contexts, not for the sake of their souls, but because it is
useful and convenient. An additional consideration is that it is the investors and not the states of investment who possess the resources of experience and skill which are needed for devising the arrangements to be
established. This is in effect part of the know-how they will be importing
into the less developed countries.
I am well aware of the fact that this paper fails to offer a simple, concrete solution to the problems we are considering. My propositions are
hedged with "ifs" and "howevers," my statements are qualified over and
over again (and I can assure you that I have omitted several qualifications
that I could and should have added). How is a businessman to act, or a
lawyer to advise, in such a situation, where no certainty is in sight, where
so many variables are of essential importance? But the present world
situation in the field of foreign investment is complex and contradictory.
It cannot be changed by merely wishing it were different. It would be of
little use to present to you an ideal system which could not possibly be put
into practice. No one can deny our need for legal certainty at the present
time; but certainty has to be founded on reality, if it is to be more than
an illusion.

